Cloud, Hardware & Space
Not all critical systems live inside the enterprise network. Cloud control planes, embedded devices, and space-based systems operate under different security assumptions, yet they often hold significant authority over data, services, and mission-critical functions.
In these environments, risk rarely appears as a single exploitable flaw. It accumulates through excessive privilege, implicit trust relationships, exposed interfaces, or weak separation between components. When those conditions are abused, the impact can extend well beyond the initial point of compromise.
Our assessments examine how identity, encryption, and control mechanisms function across cloud control planes, embedded devices, and mission infrastructure. We evaluate whether IAM design and key management in the cloud, firmware protection and update paths in hardware, and command authority and authentication in space systems meaningfully constrain what an attacker could influence if a credential, device, or control system were compromised. We show where authority could extend beyond its intended scope and how that expansion would translate into service disruption, product compromise, or mission impact.
Cloud Security Review
We analyze privilege, trust relationships, and control-plane exposure to identify where small missteps could create outsized impact.
Hardware & IoT Security Testing
We evaluate whether your hardware resists extraction, tampering, and unauthorized modification before it becomes a broader product issue.
Space Cybersecurity
We test whether mission control, key management, and command channels resist unauthorized access that could affect mission performance.
Cloud Security Review
We analyze privilege, trust relationships, and control-plane exposure to identify where small missteps could create outsized impact.
Cloud environments rarely fail because of a single dramatic vulnerability. More often, risk accumulates through excessive permissions, misconfigured services, and complex trust relationships between accounts and roles.
Traditional penetration testing does not always expose these conditions. Cloud control planes operate differently from on-prem systems, and meaningful exposure often exists in identity design, privilege inheritance, and configuration decisions rather than exploitable software flaws.
Our cloud security review is a technical, attack-informed evaluation of configuration, identity, and privilege structure across your cloud environment. We analyze how permissions are assigned, how trust is established, and how combinations of roles, services, and policies could be leveraged to gain unintended control.
We assess questions such as:
Are roles and service accounts granted more access than their function requires?
Can privilege escalation occur through role chaining, cross-account trust, or inherited permissions?
Do identity boundaries meaningfully separate environments, business units, or data domains?
Could access to management APIs, infrastructure provisioning, or sensitive data stores be expanded beyond intended limits?
Are logging and monitoring configured to provide visibility into control-plane misuse?
Your cloud permissions look correct in a spreadsheet. But has anyone tested what a compromised service account can actually reach through role chaining and cross-account trust?
The objective is not to enumerate isolated configuration findings, but to identify combinations of permissions and settings that could enable broad impact inside your cloud environment.
Findings clearly explain what each condition would allow in practice, providing a grounded view of where excessive privilege, weak boundaries, or misconfiguration could translate into disproportionate control over systems or data. The result is a clear understanding of where cloud privilege concentrates risk and where boundaries are too weak to contain it.
That clarity allows you to correct high-impact conditions deliberately, reducing the likelihood that routine operational mistakes or privilege misuse turn into cloud-wide exposure.
Hardware & IoT Security Testing
We evaluate whether your hardware resists extraction, tampering, and unauthorized modification before it becomes a broader product issue.
Embedded devices and purpose-built hardware often operate outside traditional security controls. Once deployed, they often sit in untrusted environments where physical access cannot be tightly controlled and activity is difficult to monitor.
Hardware security testing evaluates whether those devices can be analyzed, modified, or abused in ways that expose intellectual property, customer data, or core functionality. The concern is not theoretical tampering, but whether a motivated adversary could extract sensitive components or alter device behavior in a way that affects more than a single unit.
Our assessments focus on how the device protects its firmware, credentials, and update mechanisms when subjected to direct interaction. We evaluate whether physical access or low-level analysis could bypass protections the organization assumes are in place.
We assess questions such as:
Can firmware be extracted or modified outside intended controls?
Are device interfaces or diagnostic paths exposing more access than intended?
Do boot and update mechanisms prevent unauthorized modification?
Are embedded credentials and keys protected against extraction?
If one device is compromised, could the same method be repeated across the product line?
If someone buys your product off the shelf and takes it apart, what can they extract — and can they repeat it across every device you've shipped?
The objective is to determine whether the device maintains its security assumptions under realistic handling and deployment conditions.
Findings explain what each weakness would allow in practice, including data exposure, credential compromise, persistent modification, or replication of the attack across devices. The result is a clear view of product-level risk and the steps required to prevent a single device compromise from becoming a broader customer or reputational issue.
Space Cybersecurity
We test whether mission control, key management, and command channels resist unauthorized access that could affect mission performance.
Satellite and space-focused systems are now part of critical infrastructure. They support navigation, communications, financial transactions, weather monitoring, and national security. Yet their cybersecurity posture is often assessed differently from traditional IT systems, despite facing capable and motivated adversaries.
Space systems introduce unique risk. Satellites cannot be physically serviced once deployed. Ground stations may be geographically dispersed. Command channels rely on trust relationships that, if abused, can affect availability, integrity, or control of mission systems.
Space security testing evaluates whether those assumptions hold under realistic conditions. We assess how command and control interfaces, ground infrastructure, supporting networks, and associated software could be accessed or manipulated in ways that disrupt operations or compromise sensitive data.
We examine questions such as:
Could compromise of ground or mission control systems provide unauthorized command authority?
Are encryption keys and authentication material protected against extraction or misuse?
Are uplink and command paths resistant to spoofing, replay, or unauthorized instruction?
If mission data is manipulated or disrupted, how would that affect downstream services that rely on it?
Ground control authenticates commands. But if that trust chain is compromised, the satellite cannot ask for a second opinion.
The objective is not theoretical modeling, but practical evaluation of how space systems and their supporting infrastructure would withstand adversary pressure. The result is a defensible understanding of how security controls support mission assurance before they are tested in orbit.